The paper presents an analysis of the main characteristics of growth mechanism in three transitional economies -Hungary, Russia and Serbia. The author searches for an answer to the question what fundamental factors, internal and international, determined the long-term growth of the national economies in these countries from the early 1960s to the present global crisis. Wherever it was possible, he made comparisons between the pre-transition and transition periods. Applying the models of mathematical economics, the author carried out an econometric investigation to prove his hypothesis on the system effect of market reforms. He pointed out that market reforms, which were implemented consequently and combined with a growth-oriented economic policy, could substantially contribute to the attainment of better performance.
I
n this paper, an attempt will be made to describe the main characteristics of economic growth in the transitional economies of Hungary, Russia and Serbia. The timeliness of this subject is underscored by the fact that the celebration of the 20th anniversary of the fall of the Berlin wall, which took place in November 2009, demonstrated a firm consolidation of Eastern Europe around Western values. The three countries mentioned above had tried to introduce elements of market socialism already in the 1960s. But the measures aimed at partial reform, announced in Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union in 1965 and in Hungary in 1968, had failed to raise efficiency, largely because they were too limited to affect incentives. Radical economic reforms proved to be easier when political changes became rapid and fundamental in the late 1980s and early 1990s. 2 All the economies of the region, after surmounting severe transformational recessions, generally more or less benefited from these changes begun in 1989. Some of them, such as Hungary, managed to become immediately champions of market reforms, attracting formidable amounts of foreign direct investment (FDI). 3 Others, like Russia, began with a prompt shock therapy but later on were not consequent in the implementation of reform measures and thus fell behind more successful rivals. At the same time, after the default of 1998, the Putin recovery succeeded in strengthening the Russian economy, benefiting from favourable international trends primarily in the energy carrier markets. However, not all the transition countries have been beneficiaries of the end of the bipolar world from the very beginning. Thus, as a negative consequence, the decades-long special status of Yugoslavia in the "grey zone" between the two Cold War blocs was irreversibly lost. In this context, the modernisation and transition of Serbia, the largest republic of former Yugoslavia, has been an especially complicated and contradictory process with repeated setbacks. It was not just protracted but also of a different quality than in other transitional economies, receiving a decisive impetus only after the downfall of the Milošević regime in October 2000. Although Serbia had actually begun transition twice, in 1989 and 2000, many authors deem its late accession to the assembly of market economies as an advantage helping not to repeat the mistakes made by others. Indeed, it is quite impossible to repeat the developments of the 1990s, both due to dramatic changes in international socio-economic environment and to the heritage of the past leaving its mark on the mentality of a large part of society. In the specialist literature, Stephan 4 examined Hungary's gradual transition to a market economy that had begun in the 1960s. Methodologically, he used the experience of East Germany's immediate and full integration to define a set of necessary conditions of catch-up development which were subsequently reflected against the developments of the 1990s in Hungary. Schweitzer, 5 who surveyed long-term changes in Hungary's investment since the early 1950s, stated that it was the massive inflow of FDI that had mostly determined the acceleration of economic growth from the mid-1990s. Erdős 6 found that sustainable growth in the Hungarian economy could not exceed 3.5-4 percent, with economic policy directly affecting not the rate but the factors of growth.
Suvorov 7 presented the methods and results of parameter estimations of a model of technological changes for the Russian economy in the period , including an estimated macroeconomic production function. He concluded that economic growth in Russia would have inevitably decelerated and declined even if the Soviet system had been retained. Trofimov 8 estimated a 3.5-4.7 percent average annual rate of technical progress which would be necessary for Russia to achieve in the next 15-20 years the American level, assuming that the latter remained twice higher than the Russian one. Braguinsky and Myerson 9 elaborated a macroeconomic model of Russian transition which by emphasising the role of oligarchic property rights can adequately explain both the steep decline suffered by the Russian economy at the first stage of transition and the subsequent turnaround.
Palairet 10 has pointed to a protracted secular decline in the Serbian economy between 1978 and 2000, which antedated the ascendancy of Milošević, but was intensified thereafter. Stefanović 11 has emphasised the role of FDI as an essential incentive for development and transition. He has stressed that Serbia's economy faces an acute problem of lacking capital, without which no major development issue can be resolved and which necessitates a more active attraction of FDI. Cerović and Nojković 12 investigated the relationship between economic growth and transition. The results obtained by them showed a significant impact of initial conditions on economic performance and the outcome of the whole transition process. This paper has the following structure. Within its theoretical framework, the neoclassical production function as well as a world model explaining the mechanism of economic growth and development will be presented. Thereafter, the attained levels of development, as well as problems of catching-up with more developed countries and intensification of production will be analysed. This will be followed by special sections on the growth mechanism in Hungary, Russia and Serbia, respectively, which will help to draw the relevant conclusions. The author's main contention is that market reforms should have made some positive contribution to economic growth, which could be revealed by an econometric investigation. Regarding transition, the author believes that even the most successful early starters have not yet managed to complete that process, creating instead a peculiar regime of regime change. 13 
SOME THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS
Many factors affect economic growth but only two are of key importance. First, this is physical or human capital accumulation per person employed or per inhabitant. Second, there are changes in the economy's technological level expressed by the indicator of total factor productivity (TFP). These changes reflect the rate of technical progress and structural shifts. All the other factors, such as public policies, consumer preferences and market institutions determining the investment climate or the development level of infrastructural sectors, exert a positive or negative influence on the rate of economic growth through these two processes. 14 In this context, the standard neoclassical model 15 can be written down in the following form:
where Y is output, A o is a multiplier of efficiency, K is capital, L is labour and t is time. In the case variables, for the sake of simplicity, the t index was not written out. ∆t is the number of years (t-t 0 ) elapsed from some initial moment (t 0 ), α, 1-α and λ are the elasticity of output by fixed capital, labour and time, respectively. The model assumes that, in a situation of equilibrium, the parameter α corresponds to the profit share, including the share of consumption of fixed capital in the gross domestic product (GDP), which regarding the developed countries is usually taken as 1/3. We are to proceed that way in the course of our investigation, too. For its purposes, we rewrite relation (1) as follows:
where ∆ symbolises growth and A can be regarded as technical progress, or TFP.
Economic growth is essentially an interaction of fundamental production factors, which results in the emergence of output. Setting off from this definition, Simon 16 capital, L is employment, M means working and H schooling years, R is the number of researchers, i.e. scientists and engineers engaged in research and development (R&D), Z is arable land, O is oil and gas resources and t is time in years. We assume that at an annual level, M = L. 17 All these variables are a function of time. The time index is put out in the case of retarded effects. In the formulas, a capital letter denotes a function and a small letter a parameter (except the variable t). Intensity functions:
The normalising coefficients are n K = 1/385, n H = 1, n R = 1, n Z = 1 and n O = 1/1000, where the parameter n K refers to the 2000 dollar prices. These are rounded values, which do not differ significantly from the estimated ones. 18 Basic model:
The parameter g is the output produced without fixed capital during a working year that approximately corresponds to an economy's initial productivity level. Among the components in parentheses, G I is a function concerning the immobile, G M the mobile, G KR the creative technical progress and G O is a function pertaining to the effect of oil and gas resources. In formulas:
where G H = gH F H exp(-g KM F K ), G R = 1 + g R F R 2 and G T = exp(g T ∆t), where ∆t = t -1950;
The parameter g O of the oil factor is positive, the other parameters are related to negative effects. Education (F H ) negatively affects the return to oil factor because the creative activity in mining is mostly absorbed by the exploration of oil and gas resources. Therefore, the latter's separately accountable result is relatively smaller. In the approximate formula for national economy, this relationship appears in an inverse form. Among the two other negative effects, the first (g OO F O ) is connected with the fact that countries immensely rich in oil and gas annually extract relatively less of their reserves, the second (g ZO F Z ) indicates that in agrarian countries the economic importance of oil and gas production is usually smaller. A positive feature of relation (3) is that it makes easily measurable the effect of oil and gas resources on economic growth. However, at a national economy level, the formula G O yields realistic results concerning the role of the oil factor only in the case of countries having great oil and gas resource intensity. Therefore, for the other countries, it is expedient to apply relation (2).
The growth model described above is homogeneous of degree one in both of its variants, similarly to the neoclassical production function. It can be used to compare economic development to the international level, to the results that would be ensured by some factor combination in the case of world-level efficiency, since the parameters of the model, assumed to be universally valid, were determined on the basis of a worldwide investigation using data on 131 countries (see Table 1 ). In this sense, a world model supposed to be applicable for any country is at issue. The returns to factors of economic growth can be written down in an additive form by a logarithmic conversion of both sides of relation (2) and, in an analogous way, relation (3) . For this investigation, the following forms of the basic and augmented models, respectively, were used with the parameters listed in Table 1 :
where ε is the estimation error and ∆ε characterises the deviations from the world level. Here we applied the basic model for Hungary and Serbia and the augmented one for Russia.
As seen from Table 2 , the relatively high determination fits the actual productivity values of all the three countries, and the estimation errors are also acceptable. The cumulative results are better than the annual ones, i.e. the estimation errors do not cumulate but decrease in time. This is a general feature of the fit of this, an essentially development model. However, the worse but still acceptable coefficient of determination for Russia's manufacturing, especially at the level of annual data, seems to be presumably connected with data quality and methodological problems regarding primarily the Soviet period. For Serbia, the lower determination for the annual results may primarily reflect data problems related to the fact that it is difficult to investigate this country's economy with the generally used tools and methods of analysis. The main reasons are specific conditions of a Communist dictatorship combined with workers' self-management and later a decade-long war economy, exacerbated by international isolation, to which the low quality of statistics, especially for the 1990s, should be added. 20 
GENERAL DEVELOPMENT CHARACTERISTICS
Economic development means qualitative improvements in the use of production factors and structural change. Thus, it differs from economic growth which is simply a quantitative change. Economic transition implies a shift from a state-guided or self-managed model of socialist economy to a market system dominated by private ownership instead of a state or social one.
The outcome of this process is expected to ensure fast long-term economic development. 21 Transition paths can vary considerably. Thus, in the case of former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia one can speak of a "triple transition" involving political changes, economic reforms, and state-and nation-building, while in the case of Hungary only political and economic changes are relevant. 22 In economic life, quantitative growth is closely related to qualitative development. In a certain sense, all countries and social systems are always in the process of development, because even small quantitative changes of population or wealth can lead to major systemic qualitative changes. But in its classical sense, economic development can be reduced to the problem of capital accumulation, 23 which is also reflected by a key role attributed to capital intensity here. As seen from Table 3 , of the three investigated countries, long-term economic growth and rise in TFP were most dynamic in Hungary, followed by Russia and Serbia. This was true for both the national economy and manufacturing industry. Manufacturing value added (MVA) grew everywhere on average faster than GDP. Fixed capital increased more rapidly than the number of persons employed. Thus, capital intensity, K/L, became higher implying that this general regularity was valid not only macro economically, but also for manufacturing. TFP contributed most to output growth in Hungary, regarding both the total economy and manufacturing. At the same time, the lowest contribution was observed in Serbia in the former and in Russia in the latter sphere. Table 4 ). Table 5 show that it was only Hungary that managed to achieve a positive catch-up rate relative to both the EU and U.S. over the entire investigated period. Russia succeeded in it to a minimal extent only with respect to the United States. As for shorter periods, catch-up development in both relations took place in all the three transition countries at Since Hungary, Russia and Serbia, similarly to other transition countries, can be considered as belonging to the semi-periphery of contemporary world economy, their catch-up development would probably demand enormous sacrifices, which could divert for decades a significant part of resources necessary for Western Europe's participation in world competition, resulting in a distant perspective in a moderately heterogeneous and perhaps less manageable community. Therefore, the adaptation of entire Eastern Europe is not even on the agenda; its consequences would be catastrophic for the future of the European centre. Thus, one cannot expect that in the foreseeable future the European Union will significantly contribute to the economic development of semi-peripheral countries. 25 What does the intensity indicators of these three investigated countries show? From Table 6 , it can be ascertained that between 1960 and 2008, Hungary achieved the highest level among them in terms of capital intensity regarding both the total economy and manufacturing. The regime change beginning in 1989 did not alter the general picture much. Russia's macroeconomic results were most outstanding with respect to education, research and arable land intensities. However, its research intensity in manufacturing was initially lower than that of Hungary and Serbia. Available data show that the share of cumulative FDI in the total capital stock of national economy was initially largest in Hungary, but at the turn of millennium, it was Serbia that took the leading position in this respect. However, in manufacturing, Hungary managed to retain the first place to the end over the whole period 1992-2008 (see Table 7 ). In 2006-2008, the highest marginal rate of corporate income tax was 16 percent in Hungary, 24 percent in Russia and 10 percent in Serbia. 26 In this connection, one should bear in mind that the inflow of direct investments in a longer run can be efficiently stimulated not exclusively by providing various tax allowances, because their profits are much more favourably affected by a qualified workforce and a developed infrastructure. Also, an important role is played by macroeconomic, price, currency and political stability, a strict compliance with contractual obligations. 27 
Data in

GROWTH MECHANISM IN HUNGARY
What main features characterise Hungary's long-term economic development?
1. Beginning in 1968, Hungarian leaders claimed to be following a market socialist model, in which ownership of the means of production remained overwhelmingly in state hands, prices were partially decontrolled and most short-term central planning was inoperative. This New Economic Mechanism granted considerable decision-making autonomy to individual enterprises, while the central government used many methods to coordinate enterprise behaviour bureaucratically. After a period of backsliding to centralised control in the 1970s, the movement towards a market economy accelerated in the 1980s, laying the groundwork for the later gradualist transformation to capitalism. Also, before the regime change, Hungary lived in a less politically repressive atmosphere than other Soviet bloc states and avoided consumer good shortages with their attendant lines. Agricultural production based on cooperatives with flexible leasing and marketing arrangements for both inputs and outputs made the country the breadbasket of the Comecon. At the same time, the country had a fairly equal income distribution, but accumulated large foreign debts caused by the soft budget constraint, 28 as state-owned enterprises were propped up by a variety of devices.
2. With prior market experience and a financial system already in place, Hungary's economy after 1989 was able to handle the transition in a gradualist manner not based on shock therapy. However, a confused and misguided approach to land redistribution seriously damaged the previously successful agricultural sector. Taking a disciplined approach to paying its existing foreign debts and adopting a rigorous bankruptcy law in September 1991, Hungary has attracted more FDI than any other former Comecon country except Russia. Some of this funding has gone into high-technology sectors, where Hungary has considerable potential based on its highly educated population.
3. With generally well-established market institutions, reasonable macroeconomic stability and a Western European level of privatisation, Hungary is perhaps the first of the former socialist nations to have approached the completion of the transition process, especially after joining the EU in May 2004. 29 Similarly to Poland and Estonia, it became a country where the policies of discipline of hard budget constraints with institutions of corporate governance to monitor managerial behaviour and encouragement through 28 Hard budget constraints are said to exist when managers of state enterprises know that the budgets set for them by central government are fixed and that losses will not be financed out of the general revenues or by the central bank. liberalisation were most consistently pursued, resulting in a climate hospitable to domestic and foreign investments. 30 Bartha 31 contends that the positive effects of EU accession reveal themselves through two mechanisms. On the one hand, owing to expanding trade, capital investments and credit relations, as well as more favourable interest rates, they raise directly by 0.6-0.9 percentage points the economic growth of new member states. On the other hand, at least equally important is the indirect, though not easily measurable effect deriving from the reduction of risks. However, it is the institutional environment based on applicable rules and the stability of fiscal policy that are decisive from the viewpoint of assertion of potential positive effects.
In this connection, Losoncz 32 points to three economic policy challenges of Hungary's EU membership.
1. In the wake of transition to a market economy, Hungarian economic policy had to gradually give up its non-market instruments. Under such conditions, its main tasks became the strengthening of the market-and enterprise-friendly economic environment in the interest of improving international competitiveness.
2. With the EU accession, the scope for action of Hungarian economic policy and its autonomy in many fields have been modified, as the EU membership has quantitatively changed the relevant conditions.
3. The management of catching-up with the developed countries under market economy circumstances implies that economic policy must be augmented by related fields. This is helped by an adequate coordination and a convergence programme aimed at creating the necessary conditions for the country's accession to the euro zone.
Nowadays, it is mostly investment-and export-led growth that is considered as efficient and, correspondingly, an economic policy encouraging that investment and exports increase faster than GDP. 33 As seen from Hungary's economic growth in 1961-2008 had both characteristics, as not only investment (gross fixed capital formation -GFCF), but also exports expanded on average more rapidly than production. However, if the transition period (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) ) is compared to the preceding socialist era , it is visible that there was a slowdown in the growth rates of GDP and investment, whereas export expansion showed an accelerating trend. Of the external factors, the Brent oil price had declined prior to the regime change, but after 1989, it began rising at a fast pace, which was unfavourable for the energy-dependent Hungarian economy. This was accompanied by a slight long-term appreciation of the forint with respect to its equilibrium rate (Table 8) . In this connection, Erdős notes that a relatively stable, only slightly volatile, exchange rate, approximating to purchasing power parity within the range of tradable goods and services, favourably affects economic potential. Economic policy and therein directly the monetary policy can affect price-based competitiveness, in part through exchange rate policy. It can devalue the national currency, making cheaper the price of domestic goods and services for foreign buyers. Revaluation has an opposite effect. It reduces export prices in domestic currency. Prices calculated with the insertion of exchange rate become cheaper abroad, whereas domestic prices are getting more expensive for foreigners. Therefore, price-based competitiveness is deteriorating. 34 The development of Hungarian economy has for centuries been motivated by the claim to catch up with the more developed regions of Europe. This claim determined the activities of economic actors and decisions of economic policy. After the regime change, it was decisively influenced by the mass appearance of foreign-owned firms. Regarding the outstanding role of foreign ownership, it can justly be stated that it is a group of largest transnational corporations that plays a leading part in the present development model of the Hungarian economy. 35 Data in Table 9 show that the overall production impact of the foreign capital which flowed in Hungary from 1981 to 2008 was on average more than twice greater in manufacturing than in the total economy. The overwhelming part of foreign investments entered the country after the regime change. Thus, in comparison with the period 1981-1989, their contribution to output growth during the transition in 1990-2008 became much higher, especially at a macroeconomic level. Direct capital imports have a decisive role in Hungary's economic growth as the most important carrier of technology transfer and a domestic disseminator of modern corporate governance. To this must be added the widespread external market connections of affiliated companies importing capital. 36 Originally, foreign capital could enter the country only as an exception in certain specially agreed and permitted cases. However, in the early 1990s a
large-scale inflow of FDI had immediately begun, which soon became the determinant factor of Hungary's rapid economic growth, particularly in manufacturing, beginning in the mid-1990s. Hungary had a great advantage as an early reformer possessing a more mature institutional system than other transition countries. The main sphere of inward FDI within manufacturing was engineering industry. Among other sectors, trade and the financial system were of primary importance. 37 One can speak of a transfer of relatively developed technology concerning entire branches exclusively in the case of green-field investments. In other cases, technological development was limited, and especially in the beginning, there was rare significant innovation. Green-field investments operated mostly in isolation, with high import content. An exception was Suzuki, but this firm had no significant innovative impact either, as it was bringing the technologically sensitive components from abroad. Nonetheless, by 1998 it was Hungary's transnational sector that, regarding its size, had become the largest in the region. 38 What was the role of fundamental factors in Hungary's economic growth before and after the regime change? This question can be answered with the help of the endogenous model described above. For that purpose, we put the data on Hungary's economy from the Appendix in relation (2a) and obtained the results of investigation shown in Table 10 .
What conclusions can be drawn from these calculations? 1. Concerning the entire investigated period of 1961-2008, it was the mobile factor (∆F K G M ) in the national economy and the immobile one (∆F K G I ) in manufacturing that made the most significant contribution to the achieved growth. The creative factor (∆F K G KR ), describing the role of human capital, was more important macro economically than at a manufacturing level.
2. In the transition period (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) , the macroeconomic importance of mobile technical progress somewhat declined as compared to the socialist era . At the same time, the return to immobile technical progress rose above one-third, whereas creative technical progress became slightly less significant. In manufacturing, there was an increase in the significance of all 37 Schweitzer Iván, "A hazai beruházások alakulása, aránya a GDP-ben és szerkezete", op.
cit three types of technical progress, but especially in that of the immobile one, reflecting learning by doing. 3. The amount of labour (M) generally contributed negatively to economic growth, with the exception of the socialist period. However, even then it played only a marginal role, particularly at a national economy level. 4. Overall, the level of Hungary's development was somewhat nearer to international standards in manufacturing than macro economically. In this respect, the transition period showed an obvious improvement over the pretransition years, reflected in significant positive deviations from the world level, especially in the total economy, which may be considered as a kind of system effect attributable to accelerated market reforms leading to emergence of more or less mature capitalist relations built in a globalised context.
GROWTH MECHANISM IN RUSSIA
What are the main characteristics of the long-term development of Russian economy? 1961 1. Stalin's death in March 1953 signalled that the development of Soviet model, designed to produce a speedy shift from a relatively backward nation to a modern industrial society, became increasingly dysfunctional. The first round of the ensuing reform cycle had already demonstrated that the ruling elite actually wished to change the systemic mechanism without altering its principles. Consumer good shortages appeared, masked by state provision of public goods and subsidised staples. There was an increasing gap between the poor quality of public goods used by the population and the goods available to the elite. Following the failed attempt by Khrushchev to decentralise the management of national economy in the late 1950s and early 1960s, Brezhnev and Kosygin tried in 1965 to increase the autonomy of enterprises making them more profit-oriented. After the abandonment of Khrushchev's regional decentralisation, the Soviet leaders reorganised the economic bureaucracy in line with the branch principle of management and created associations of industrial enterprises and research institutes for scientific planning. The Czechoslovak events of 1968 only enhanced these tendencies to facilitate central control during the 1970s.
2. The slowdown in growth rates from the mid-1970s to economic stagnation in the 1980s, along with environmental problems, attested to central planners' inability to deal with a complex over-industrialised economy's need for constant adjustments. Monopolistic producers and risk-averse managers lacked the impetus to innovate, which led to technological backwardness. Full employment guarantees disguised hidden unemployment and favoured labourintensive production. The soft budget constraint policy resulted in wasteful resource use when the costs of non-profitable production were borne solely by the state. Domestic production had limited exposure to international trade and became uncompetitive, except for raw materials and some military goods. Gorbachev's perestroika (1985-1991) involved a new succession of reforms, which, however, failed to improve central planning, were unsuccessful in questioning state ownership and died out completely in the late 1980s after reenactment of the 1965 self-accounting enterprise reform in the form of the 1987 Law on Enterprise, the last of the command reforms. On the other hand, the late 1980s produced legal recognition of a variety of property arrangements ranging from cautious introduction of cooperatives to individual proprietorship. The recognition of private property in Russia clearly broke with a long history of denying private economic activity.
3. The economic transition in Russia, which received a decisive impetus in December 1991 as a result of the collapse of the USSR, is a process of making a break with the institutional legacies of the Soviet economy, which demonstrated remarkable resilience and the ability to adapt to new realities. The Russian transition turned to be a nomenclature revolution when the power elites successfully consolidated their political dominance with economic wealth. The nomenclature, a class produced by the Soviet economy, succeeded in carrying its influence into the post-the Soviet economy and reasserted its dominance. 39 Under Yeltsin's presidency (1991-1999), a shock therapy was carried out, intended to put the economy on a rebound growth track. Owing to its mostly political nature, it was labelled market bolshevism. 40 Though Russia liberalised its economy, for a long time it failed to maintain discipline through hard budget constraints. It was also unable to contain tunnelling, the expropriation of assets and income belonging to minority shareholders, and theft through either rule of law or administrative control. Though it did encourage new entry early in the transition, the capture of the state by a narrow set of vested enterprises -old enterprises and well-connected early entrantsdiscouraged further entry and created a poor investment climate, resulting in a pattern of protection and selective encouragement. 41 Russian privatisation was successful in introducing new owners of plants and equipment, but failed to create effective corporate governance. The combination of mostly unrestructured enterprises and revenue-starved government budgets compounded by capital flight severely undercut investment. This situation prolonged Russia's transformational recession and ultimately resulted in the proliferation of virtual economy. When Putin came to power, increasing oil prices in 2000-2001 had a stimulating effect on the economy, which started showing signs of better growth rates and a decline in the virtual economy. 42 Data in Table 11 show that the question of the character of economic growth in Russia can only be considered in part, as there are no available export data for the period prior to 1990. Moreover, the situation is complicated by a downturn in 1991-1998, when the GDP substantially contracted. Fixed investments in that period declined about thrice faster than the volume of GDP. As a consequence, in the period under study, production was directed by negative investment, which is economically quite understandable if we recall Keynes' multiplier. With a view to an excessive earlier development of defence industry, the whole process can be conceived to a certain extent as an inevitable correction. 43 At the same time, the decline in production was curbed by a relatively rapid increase in exports.
According to Table 11 , investment directed the growth of Russia's economy in 1961-1990 and even more markedly in the reconstruction period following the default of 1998 when a significant export expansion was under way, which also exerted a guiding influence on economic growth. However, this growth was seriously affected by the world market price of crude oil and the related natural gas. Thus, the Urals oil price, which has a determinant importance for the country, fluctuated mostly unfavourably in the period from 1985 to 1998, but after 1998 the situation radically changed (see Table 11 ). Previously, it had restrained, but after the default, began to feed economic growth.
In this context, Hanson 44 points to two developments that jolted the Russian economy into growth after the crisis: a five-fold devaluation of the rouble in the course of a few months and, a little later, an upturn in oil prices in 1999 and 2000. After 1990, large tracts of Russian manufacturing had been almost destroyed by import competition of 5-6 roubles to the U.S. dollar; at 25 roubles to the dollar, they revived. The rapid growth was well managed. The Ministry of Finance was relentlessly prudent, resisting public spending increases and channelling a large slice of the windfall revenues from high oil prices into a Stabilisation Fund, which, in turn, was used in part to pay off public and publicly guaranteed external debt, which decreased from USD 111 billion in 2000 to USD 70.4 billion in 2007. 45 Russian firms took enthusiastically to borrowing abroad, even as the state paid off much of its debts (a good deal of the borrowing was by statecontrolled firms). It was foreign trade that kicked off the recovery: a cut in imports because of the rouble devaluation and then a surge in export earnings as oil prices rose and oil companies responded by boosting production and exports. Later on, however, domestic demand, for both consumption and investment, became the immediate driver of growth. This demand was able to grow because of the surge in profits, government revenue and personal incomes generated by rising oil, gas and metal earnings from abroad. 46 Many analysts emphasise that a faster growth connected with rising oil and gas incomes occurred in Russia without overcoming structural and competitive weaknesses. 47 It is noticeable that under Putin's presidency, the share of fuels in Russian exports expanded from 51.7 percent in 2000 to 66.5 percent in 2008, while the relative weight of other mining products contracted from 16.8 to 7.8 percent, respectively. 48 The post-default recovery was ensured chiefly by cyclical factors and took place on an obsolete technological base, whose degradation began under the perestroika. At the same time, the revaluation of the rouble encouraged Russian enterprises to cut their costs and, applying high technology, raise their competitiveness. 49 Data in Table 12 show that in 1991-2008, foreign investments contributed on average with more than a quarter to macroeconomic growth. In the postdefault period (1999-2008), their contribution was somewhat higher in manufacturing than in the total economy. The main spheres which attracted most FDI in Russia were manufacturing, transport and communications, mining and therein oil and gas extraction, as well as trade and catering, financial and real estate activities, and utilities. 50 Business environment became more problematic following the turn to an aggressive form of state intervention in 2003, hallmarked by the case of Yukos. Despite some privatisations, including sales of electricity-generating companies, state ownership loomed large in banking, oil, gas and defence-related production. In the oil and gas sector, the Russian authorities had preserved from Soviet times a state monopoly in export pipelines, even during the period of strong private oil companies up to 2004. 51 To determine the role of fundamental growth factors, the data on Russia's economy from the Appendix were put in relation (3a). Thus, the results of investigation shown in Table 13 Table A2 .
What conclusions can be drawn from these calculations? 1. In the entire period under study , the mobile factor contributed with nearly two-fifths and the immobile one with one-fifth to the Russian economy's growth. The creative factor ensured less and the effect of oil and gas resources (∆F K G O ) more than a quarter of macroeconomic growth. In manufacturing, the return to the immobile technical progress was a little higher than that to the mobile one, while the one-fourth contribution of the creative technical progress was similar to its role at a macroeconomic level.
2. In the reform period after 1990, Russian manufacturing was not the engine of economic growth. By 2008, its value added in real terms reached only 67 percent of its 1990 level (see Table A2 in the Appendix). Macro economically, the immobile growth component became somewhat more important during the transition (1991-2008) than in the Soviet era . The contribution of the mobile component slightly decreased, while that of the creative one remained practically unchanged. The return to the oil factor rose from more than a quarter to nearly a third due to an increased natural resource intensity, accompanied by a decelerated growth.
3. Overall, the amount of labour contributed with less than one-fifth to macroeconomic growth, but it was more than one and a half times more significant under socialism. At the same time, manufacturing growth was exclusively based on rising productivity.
4. In the Soviet era, the Russian economy's development, despite its largely successful industrialisation, was characterised by a marked negative deviation from international standards at a macroeconomic level. Although 
GROWTH MECHANISM IN SERBIA
The Serbian economy between 1946 and 1992 developed within the former Yugoslavia where beginning in 1950, central planning was gradually transformed into a system of workers' self-management, which coexisted with strong individual holdings in agriculture. The reforms of the 1960s created a specific type of market socialism with purely indicative planning and a degree of economic freedom even higher than in Hungary. In 1963, socialist selfmanagement was introduced, comprising all spheres of economics and politics. The 1974 constitution and the 1976 Law on Associated Labour made the system atomised in the form of various labour organisations that existed until the late 1980s. A chronic confrontation emerged between a required highdegree organisation of modern production and an atomised economy, exacerbated by Tito's death in May 1980 and the subsequent rise of Serbian populism under Slobodan Milošević. However, the economic decline of the 1980s was caused primarily not by that conflict but by the incompletely removed state-bureaucratic controls over the economy. 52 Though from 1989 onwards Serbia was set on the road to capitalism, it had to go through several economic policy cycles.
1. During the 1990s, Serbian economy was dominated by inefficient social and public ownership. A lack of financial and fiscal discipline led to widespread corruption. The state became an all-powerful arbitrator in a militarised economy with selective benefits for subsidised branches and privileged taxpayers. 56 As shown in Table 14 , economic growth in Serbia was not investmentoriented even during the socialist era (1961-1989) when it was relatively rapid. The protracted socio-economic crisis led to a drastic decline in investment from 1990 to 2000. More than a decade its total volume was lower than the consumption of fixed assets. The economy got into a vicious circle. Low incomes, negative real interest rates and the general lack of trust in the banking system resulted in low savings. Low savings, together with international financial sanctions forestalled investments. Modest investment activity, weak corporate governance and hidden unemployment restrained productivity, the low level of which caused low incomes and corporate insolvency. 57 The acceleration of transition at the turn of millennium resulted later in a faster macroeconomic development than prior to the 1990s. In this respect, Serbia managed to outpace Hungary, but lagged behind Russia (see the Appendix). Note. See Table 8 After the October changes of 2000, the average annual growth of GFCF became faster than that of GDP but even so in 2008 it attained merely 36% of the 1989 level of investment (see Table 14 and its data sources). A National Investment Plan accepted by the government in September 2006, aimed fundamentally at infrastructural investments (dwellings, roads, etc.), was regarded as an important instrument of promoting the country's European integration. Although in 2001-2008 exports increased on average more rapidly than production, this did not affect much the traditionally weak export orientation of Serbian companies dating back to the times of former Yugoslavia, where inter-republic trade on the basis of political dealings was much more intensive than international transactions. 58 From Table 14 it is also evident that the dinar's equilibrium exchange rate showed a slight appreciation in the period from 1961 through 2008. The Brent oil price, relevant for Serbia, was on average favourable prior to the transition, when it was sharply falling between 1983 and 1989, but its subsequent rise had a negative impact on the country's energy-dependent economy. In Serbia, because of low domestic saving, foreign capital is an important source of financing consumption, as well as fixed investments. In 1993-2008, FDI inflows generated on average about two-fifths of GDP increase. However, if the shorter period of accelerated transition (2001-2008) is considered, their contribution decreases by half, despite the fact that in the latter period foreign capital played a determinant role in increasing MVA (see Table 15 ). Foreign capital invested in Serbia has not yet managed to bring a comprehensive renewal of productive capacities. The largest sectors in terms of the share in received investments are financial intermediation; manufacturing; transport, storage and communication; trade and repairs; and real estate, renting and business activities. 59 In this respect, the country is at the initial stage, for it is fundamentally dominated by sectors using cheap raw materials and labour force. The motivating factors include additional elements typical for less developed countries such as an accelerating privatisation process and the satisfaction of domestic demand, especially in the field of consumer goods and services. Many observers believe that because of its phase delay in transition and isolation of earlier years, Serbia, despite the present crisis, may stand before an appreciation similar to that which happened in the more developed countries of Central Europe in the mid-1990s. 60 Table 15 Concerning the role of fundamental growth factors, the data on Serbia's economy from the Appendix were put in relation (2a) in order to obtain the results of investigation shown in Table 16 . Table A3 .
What conclusions can be drawn from these calculations? 1. Considering the entire period 1961-2008, the most important macroeconomic factor was the amount of labour, which gave a predominantly extensive character to overall growth. Among the other factors, it was the mobile technical progress that had the highest return. By contrast, the intensive manufacturing growth was nearly to the same extent determined by the immobile and mobile types of technical progress.
2. The immobile technical progress was more pronounced in manufacturing than in the total economy. It was much less significant macro economically.
3. The creative technical progress had about a one and a half times higher share in the total economy than in manufacturing.
4. If shorter periods are examined, the mostly extensive character of macroeconomic development becomes more marked in Hungary, a significant part of Serbia's workforce was transferred to manufacturing from other sectors of the economy, first of all from agriculture, in the course of socialist construction. At the same time, the increasing amount of labour in manufacturing ensured only around two-fifths of that sector's output growth. By contrast, the reform period of 2001-2008 was characterised by negative returns to labour both in the national economy and even more in manufacturing. 5. In the investigated period, the development of Serbian economy generally lagged behind international standards, but it stood much better at a manufacturing than a national economy level. Here, too, a positive reform effect can be revealed, in this case for the period 2001-2008, which was macro economically somewhere between that of Hungary and Russia. However, it was much less formidable in manufacturing than in the total economy.
CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, the main characteristics of growth mechanism were analysed in Hungary, Russia and Serbia from the early 1960s to the present global crisis. To break down economic growth by its fundamental factors, an endogenous development model was applied, whose parameters can be assumed to be valid for any country of the world. Relying on the obtained results, the following conclusions can be made.
1. Considering the entire investigated period of 1961-2008, the mobile technical progress was the most important macroeconomic growth factor in Hungary and Russia. By contrast, in Serbia, the most significant role was played by labour, which gave a predominantly extensive character to overall growth, which becomes more marked if shorter periods are examined, with the exception of 2001-2008 when there were negative returns to labour both in the national economy and manufacturing.
2. In the manufacturing sector, it was the immobile technical progress that made the relatively largest contribution to the achieved growth of intensive character in all the three countries.
3. In Hungary and Serbia, the creative technical progress, reflecting the role of human capital, was more important macro economically than at a manufacturing level, while in the case of Russia, the opposite was true.
4. It is remarkable that in Russia's macroeconomic growth, the importance of the oil factor, increasing in time, seems to have been greater than the role of human capital.
5. In Hungary and Russia, the immobile growth factor became macro economically more important during the transition than in the socialist era. In the Serbian economy, on the contrary, the acceleration of transition after 2000 enhanced further the leading role of the mobile factor.
6. In manufacturing, the comparison of two sub-periods gives a different picture, which shows that in Hungary the importance of all three types of technical progress was increasing, whereas in Serbia there was a certain decline in the significance of the creative growth component.
7. Overall, regarding the whole investigated period, the development level of the three countries at issue was substantially nearer to international standards in manufacturing than in the national economy. The transition period showed an improvement over the pre-transition years, reflected in significant positive deviations from the world level, especially in the total economy, corroborating our hypothesis on the system effect of market reforms. In our case, this effect seems to be macro economically strongest in Hungary, followed by Serbia and Russia. In this connection, it should be pointed out that consequently implemented market reforms combined with a growth-oriented economic policy could substantially contribute to the attainment of better performance. R Mt-2 = FTE number of manufacturing scientists and engineers engaged in R&D (considering a two-year lag, in thousands); Z = arable land (in million hectares); O t-1 = crude oil and natural gas resources (at the end of the year preceding the reference year, in million tonnes of oil equivalent).
APPENDIX
Notes
For Hungary, data on fixed assets should have been estimated, as after 1991 they are not regularly published. For that country, we accepted as initial the 1960 data (the average of 1959 and 1960 year-end values) derived from the Hungarian Central Statistical Office (HCSO). In the course of estimating data for further years, we added to them the fixed investments of the preceding year at constant prices and subtracted real depreciation (3.3 percent for the national economy and 4.9 percent for manufacturing).
For Serbia, where all data refer to the present territory of the republic excluding Kosovo, the relevant mid-year data analogously calculated from the Federal Statistical Office of Yugoslavia (SZS) and (for the years after 2001) annual financial statements of enterprises were used.
In both cases, current values were converted to real ones with the help of the corresponding investment price index. 61 For Russia, the average annual values of fixed assets were derived from the Federal State Statistics Service (Rosstat). 
